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Abstract A belief is stored if it is in no way before the subject’s mind. The problem
of stored beliefs is that of satisfactorily explaining how the stored beliefs which
seem justified are indeed justified. In this paper I challenge the two main internalist
attempts to solve this problem. Internalism about epistemic justification, at a min-
imum, states that one’s mental life alone determines what one is justified in
believing. First I dispute the attempt from epistemic conservatism, which states that
believing justifies retaining belief. Then I defend the attempt from dispositionalism,
which assigns a justifying role to dispositions, from some key objections. But by
drawing on cognitive psychological research I show that, for internalism, the
problem of stored beliefs remains.
1 Introduction
Most justified beliefs, it seems, are stored in memory. Usually, our justified beliefs
about our past, geography, philosophy, world history, and most other topics are non-
occurrent. We are not thinking about, reasoning from, acting from, or having an
experience concerning these beliefs or their content. Of course, a belief can be both
stored and occurrent, just as a song can be both stored and playing on one’s
computer. But most justified beliefs are merely stored (hereafter stored). They are in
no way before our minds.
The problem of stored beliefs is the problem of satisfactorily explaining how the
stored beliefs which seem justified are indeed justified. In this paper, I argue that
internalists about epistemic justification have not solved this problem for their view.
Internalism, at a minimum, states two theses. First, that possible beings who are
& Matthew Frise
matthew_frise@baylor.edu
1 Baylor University, One Bear Place #97273, Waco, TX 76798-7273, USA
123
Erkenn (2017) 82:285–304
DOI 10.1007/s10670-016-9817-7
mentally identical are, to the same degree, justified in believing the same
propositions.1 No contingent fact about a subject’s environment affects her
justification unless it affects her mental states. Someone whose experiences are
identical to yours but who is massively deceived by an evil demon is justified in
believing the same propositions you are. Second, that all justifying features are
mental. It is controversial among internalists exactly what these features are, and
controversial whether these features must be specially accessible or made aware to
the subject. This paper remains neutral on these controversies. Internalism here
covers all views that entail the two minimal theses. Most views in this broad range
add further necessary conditions on having justification, restricting which mental
features justify.
Some philosophers deny internalism because they think it cannot solve the
problem of stored beliefs.2 They think that even if internalism accounts for the
justification of some justified stored beliefs, our mental lives are too impoverished
to account for the justification of all. If internalism cannot solve the problem, it is
significantly discredited. This result is especially noteworthy when internalism picks
out (as it does here) a broad range of views. If the problem has no solution when we
assume just the two minimal theses, then every variety of internalism is threatened.
Varieties that add further necessary conditions on justification arguably worsen the
problem. The varieties might restrict justifying mental features to those which are
factive, those which the subject is aware of, those specially accessible to the subject,
those which consist in seemings, etc. If the mental life is too meager to account for
some array of justification, the restricted mental life is too meager too.
What’s more, without a solution to the problem, one of the best arguments for
internalism fails. The argument alleges that internalism’s implications match our
intuitions about when a subject is or is not justified in believing a proposition.3
Internalism ‘‘gets the cases right’’. If internalism cannot solve the problem of stored
beliefs, it gets some cases wrong.
While I think internalists can solve this problem, my aim in this paper is to
challenge the only internalist attempts in the literature.4 First I dispute the
unchallenged attempt from epistemic conservatism. Then I examine the attempt
from a view I call dispositionalism, which assigns a justifying role to dispositions. I
clarify and develop dispositionalism, and defend its attempt from some key
objections. But, by drawing on cognitive psychological research, I show that the
problem of stored beliefs remains. If I am correct, internalism’s only hope lies in a
fresh defense. And the prospects for such a defense remain unclear.
1 Cf. Conee and Feldman (2004: 56).
2 See Goldman (1999, 2009, 2011), Senor (1993, 2009), and Williamson (2007). Cf. Frise (2015),
Harman (1986) and Huemer (1999). Pappas (1980) discovered the problem, Senor (1993) directed it at
internalism, and Goldman (1999) named it.
3 Cf. Conee and Feldman (2004: 58–61).
4 I defend an internalist solution in Frise (manuscript a). It is worth noting that externalism faces the
problem of stored beliefs too. According to externalism, a contingent feature of a subject’s environment
can affect her justification without affecting her mental life. But defenders of externalism think they can
readily solve the problem. I challenge their attempt in Frise (manuscript b).
286 M. Frise
123
A preliminary remark is in order. ‘‘The problem of stored beliefs’’ is an
importantly infelicitous name. It seems there is in fact more than one relevant
problem, or that there are underappreciated dimensions to the problem of stored
beliefs. As stated so far, the problem concerns only doxastic justification, the
justification of an attitude one has. In particular, the problem concerns the
justification of doxastic attitudes that one has stored. But there are some
propositions that are not before the subject’s mind, propositions that the subject
should, but does not, believe. And there are stored beliefs a subject should have and
indeed has, but has for the wrong reasons. How does a theory of justification
satisfactorily explain these should-claims? In other words, it is important to reflect
also on a subject’s propositional justification, her justification to have some attitude
toward a proposition regardless of whether she in fact has the attitude or has it on
the basis of her support. Sometimes, a subject has propositional justification for
believing that p but lacks doxastic justification, where p is not before her mind.
Consider:
DESI
Desi has a stored belief that fairies exist, and she has good enough reason to
believe that they do: she remembers that her clearly trustworthy brother told
her so. But what caused and currently sustains her belief that fairies exist is
simply her desire that they exist. She has no relevant higher-order belief about
how she has good reason to believe that fairies exist.
Because of its basis, Desi’s stored belief that fairies exist is not doxastically justified
(her belief is improperly caused, she has no suitable higher-order belief about it, or
whatever). But Desi has propositional justification for believing that fairies exist.
She would have this justification even if she did not believe that fairies exist. A
theory of justification that does not account for this has a problem, even if it
accounts for the doxastic justification of all of Desi’s justified stored beliefs. The
problem concerns the propositional justification one has for propositions not before
one’s mind. Call it the propositional problem of stored beliefs, and call the more
familiar problem the doxastic problem.
Since doxastic justification requires propositional justification, the two problems
largely overlap. Importantly, they are just instances of a more general problem: that
of accounting for all justification concerning propositions not before the subject’s
mind.5 Even if a view solves the familiar doxastic problem, the general problem can
remain. And a view is badly off if it cannot solve the general problem. The
significance of this will become clear in the next section. For simplicity I often just
discuss the more familiar problem.
5 ‘‘The problem of stored beliefs’’ is not fully apt in other ways. There is a problem if there is a single
stored belief the justification of which is not explained. So, ‘‘beliefs’’ is misleading. And suspended
judgment and disbelief can also be stored bearers of justification. To focus on the problem concerning just
beliefs is not to exhaust the relevant problems. For simplicity, this paper sets these observations aside.
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2 Epistemic Conservatism
I will give three reasons for thinking that epistemic conservatism, even if true, does
not solve the problem of stored beliefs for internalism. First I will explain the view.
According to McGrath (2007: 14), epistemic conservatism is the view that ‘‘if one
believes that p, then one is prima facie rational in retaining that belief.’’6 One is
justified in continuing to believe a proposition as long as one lacks reason to
abandon belief. If Maria believes that dairy milk comes from cows, she is overall
justified in retaining that belief if she has no defeaters—no reason to think that dairy
milk does not come from cows, that her memory is especially defective, that she
originally formed her belief for no good reason, and so on. Her having this
justification does not require her to have, or to be disposed to have, an experience
with memorial phenomenology that represents memory as generally accurate or
represents dairy milk as coming from cows. And it does not matter whether Maria’s
belief is occurrent or stored. It still justifies her in retaining the belief.
Epistemic conservatism is typically understood to be a form of internalism and
all its advocates advocate internalism.7 It suggests that beliefs justify, and beliefs are
mental states, so it suggests that mental states justify. But epistemic conservatism
states only a sufficient condition for having justification, not a necessary condition.
For all that epistemic conservatives have said, non-mental differences could result
in justificatory differences. Still, epistemic conservatism is compatible with
internalism. It offers a resource some internalists utilize when accounting for the
justification that many beliefs have via memory.8 The varieties of internalism
compatible with epistemic conservatism could have a solution to the problem of
stored beliefs. If they have one, it is false that the two minimal theses of internalism
prevent it from solving the problem. Of course, epistemic conservatism is no help to
the varieties of internalism it is incompatible with. If it solves the problem, perhaps
we should reject those varieties.
Now, epistemic conservatism states a sufficient condition for justifiedly retaining
a belief. Retains picks out a dynamic relation. It identifies a relation between objects
over time. Epistemic conservatism states that a subject’s having a belief at one time
prima facie justifies the subject in having it a moment later. If the subject has the
6 Cf. Harman (1986: Ch. 4) and McCain (2008: 186). In light of an objection, McGrath (2007: 21)
eventually restates the view in a restricted form: If S believes that p, then S is rational to retain belief that
p iff condition C obtains. McGrath (2007: 21 n. 39) expresses doubts about this formulation, and does not
attempt to defend any particular interpretation of C. In the absence of such an interpretation, the epistemic
conservative solution to the problem of stored beliefs faces the first objection I will give above. And even
in the presence of such an interpretation, the epistemic conservative solution still faces my other
objections.
‘‘Epistemic conservatism’’ may not be an ideal name for the view discussed in this section, since it
sometimes refers to a genus of views, whose species include doxastic conservatism and phenomenal
conservatism. Doxastic conservatism is the view that McGrath and others call ‘‘epistemic conservatism,’’
and phenomenal conservatism is the view that if it seems to S that p, then S has prima facie justification
for believing that p. Since I am primarily engaging McGrath here, I follow his terminology.
7 See e.g. McGrath (2007: 5), Poston (2014: 38–42).
8 See e.g. McCain (2008), McGrath (2007), and Poston (2016).
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belief a moment later, it is justified. Epistemic conservatism is thereby a theory of
diachronic justification. More precisely, where t1 and t2 pick out successive times:
EC1. If S believes that p at t1, then S is prima facie justified in believing that
p at t2.
EC2. If S believes that p at t1 and at t2, then S’s belief at t2 is prima facie
justified.
EC1 states epistemic conservatism’s sufficient condition for propositional justifi-
cation (for simplicity I often drop the ‘‘prima facie’’). EC2 states epistemic
conservatism’s sufficient condition for doxastic justification.
McGrath and other epistemic conservatives have not made the temporal
parameters of their view formal, as EC1 and EC2 do. But McGrath (2007: 2) is
clear that epistemic conservatism is a theory about justification as it pertains to the
‘‘dynamics of belief,’’ not the ‘‘statics of belief.’’ EC1 and EC2 make precise the
dynamic temporal relation expressed by ‘‘rational in retaining.’’ Since what the
subject allegedly is rational in retaining is a belief, epistemic conservatism states not
just a theory about propositional justification, but also theory about doxastic
justification. Again, part of the appeal of epistemic conservatism is its alleged
ability to account for the justification of the beliefs that memory preserves
(especially in cases where one forgets one’s original evidence). Epistemic
conservatism is not a theory of synchronic justification, a theory about what at a
time justifies belief at that time. This is for the best, because epistemic conservatism
as a theory of synchronic justification, a theory about only t1, seems false:
EC3. If S believes that p at t1, then S is prima facie justified in believing that
p at t1.
EC4. If S believes that p at t1, then S’s belief at t1 is prima facie justified.
EC3 seems false because a belief does not seem to be self-supporting at a time. In
fact, McGrath (2013: 245) agrees. Having a belief does not by itself support its
content, although having had belief might support its content—it might be plausible
that we should trust our past selves, other things being equal. And even if a belief
could support itself, EC4 seems false. Arguably, in order for a belief to be
doxastically justified, it must be caused by whatever justifies it. But a belief cannot
cause itself at a time, just as a fire cannot cause itself at a time. At best a belief that
p at one time can cause a belief that p a moment later, just as a fire at one time can
cause a fire a moment later. EC1–EC4 exhaust the promising formalizations of
epistemic conservatism. EC3 and EC4 fail to capture its dynamic character and
seem false. Epistemic conservatism is best understood as EC1 and EC2.9
9 Cf. McCain (2008: 188), McGrath (2007: 17–18) and Poston (2014: 18), who are best read as endorsing
EC1 and EC2. A theory placing a causal requirement on doxastic justification can still be internalist, if it
states that mental features alone propositionally justify. For such an internalist theory, see McCain (2014:
Chs. 5 and 6). Moon (2012a: 316), while granting that epistemic conservatism is true, questions whether a
belief gains positive epistemic status by being based on itself, and questions whether in a specific case a
belief is in fact based on itself. Unlike Moon, I question whether a belief can ever be based on itself at a
time, and I specifically identify a causal problem for such synchronic basing.
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McGrath (2007: 21–22) thinks epistemic conservatism solves the problem of
stored beliefs. The stored beliefs that we are inclined to count as justified are
typically ones that we do not have overall reason to abandon. So, we are justified in
retaining them. Epistemic conservatism seems to solve the problem, and no one has
objected to it as a solution.
A first worry for epistemic conservatism as a solution to the problem of stored
beliefs is that it seems to get DESI wrong. EC2 implies that Desi’s stored belief that
fairies exist is prima facie justified, since Desi had that belief a moment ago. The
bad basis of her belief does not prevent it from being prima facie justified. EC2
states no constraints on the causes or sustainers of justified beliefs. As long as the
subject still has a belief, it has justification now, regardless what sustains it. Unless
Desi has some defeater for her belief, it is according to epistemic conservatism
justified overall. But her belief is not justified overall.
The epistemic conservative could reply that there is a defeater for Desi’s belief.
McGrath (2007: 18) is fairly liberal about defeating conditions: ‘‘defeaters,
possessed or not, which are ‘constructible’ from one’s current perspective, are
potential defeating conditions’’. But even if we grant this view about defeating
conditions, it is implausible that there must be a defeater constructible from Desi’s
perspective. It is rarely clear from one’s current perspective what originally caused
or now sustains any of one’s beliefs, even when one’s good reasons caused and
sustain one’s beliefs. We can stipulate that Desi cannot tell that her fairy belief is
based on desire, and so she lacks the materials to construct a defeater. Consequently,
epistemic conservatism counts her unjustified stored belief that fairies exist as
justified full stop. Epistemic conservatism fails to solve the problem of stored
beliefs.10
Second, while EC2 can account for the justification of a subject’s belief that p at
t2, it does not thereby account for the justification of the subject’s belief that p at t1.
This is a problem because not all possible justified stored beliefs are believed at
some earlier time. Consider:
VIC
Vic is a victim in a memorial skeptical scenario. An evil demon popped Vic
into existence at noon today—he did not exist until then. At noon Vic’s mental
states are identical to Ric’s. Ric came about in the ordinary way, long before
noon. He believes many things and has many apparent memories. Vic, being
Ric’s mental twin, believes the same things and has the same apparent
memories. Many of these beliefs are justified and stored.11
10 McGrath (2013: 245) independently notes that cases like DESI threaten epistemic conservatism. He
thinks they are potential counterexamples to his theory. (For that reason, in personal correspondence, he
found EC1 more attractive than EC2). It is worth emphasizing that even if they are not counterexamples,
they show that epistemic conservatism fails to solve the problem of stored beliefs. It is also worth noting
that epistemic conservatism and dispositionalism (see Sect. 3) are silent on how it is that stored suspended
judgment can be justified. These views need to be expanded in order to account for this justification.
11 VIC resembles a case developed by Bertrand Russell and discussed by Frise (2015), Huemer (1999:
350–352), and Moon (2012b: 352–357), a case in which the world came about only 5 min ago and nearly
all beliefs about the past are false. However, VIC differs importantly from Russell’s case. VIC focuses on
justification at the moment of creation, not 5 min after. Epistemic conservatism more easily accounts for
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There is no reason to doubt that VIC is possible. Victims in memory skeptical
scenarios seem able to have stored beliefs when they come into existence, and it
seems that many of these beliefs could be justified, especially when the victims have
mental twins with many justified stored beliefs. What’s more, internalism is often
motivated by the ‘new evil demon problem’, which centers on a structurally parallel
case to VIC but which concerns external-world skeptical scenarios, not memory
skeptical scenarios. Internalists will have special reason to grant that VIC is
possible.
VIC, if possible, reveals that epistemic conservatism poorly solves the problem
of stored beliefs. Since Vic does not exist before noon, he of course does not believe
anything prior to noon. So, Vic has no antecedent beliefs which could explain the
justification of any of his stored beliefs at noon. McGrath mistakenly supposes that
for every justified stored belief that p, there is a prior belief that p. But a belief,
justified or not, can be stored even if it has not been previously held. A belief is
stored so long as it is not before the subject’s mind. EC2, even if true, does not solve
the problem of stored beliefs. To be clear, the basic reason is this. Epistemic
conservatism is just a thesis about justified belief retention, not about justified belief
formation. It does not account for the justification of any belief that is stored directly
at the time of its formation.
One might reply as follows. If a subject’s belief that p is doxastically justified,
then the belief is caused by that which justifies the subject in believing that p. And
causation always takes time. Whatever it was that brought about Vic’s beliefs at
noon, it was not something that justified him in believing that p a moment before.
Since Vic did not exist until noon, prior to noon nothing justified him in believing
anything. Vic’s beliefs at noon are therefore not caused by their justifiers, and so
they are not doxastically justified at noon. So, VIC does not reveal that there are
justified stored beliefs which epistemic conservatism cannot account for.
I will grant that causation always take time, although this thesis does face
objections. VIC still introduces trouble for epistemic conservatism as a solution to the
problem of stored beliefs. For EC1 does not explain Vic’s propositional justification at
noon. We can grant that Vic has no justified stored beliefs at noon, since none of his
beliefs are at noon based on his justification. But it is plausible that at noon Vic is
justified in believing many things, including the contents of some of his stored beliefs.
Yet EC1 does not credit Vic as having justification for believing anything he believes.
The antecedent of EC1 is not satisfied, since Vic did not exist a moment before noon.
Epistemic conservatism fails to solve the propositional problem of stored beliefs. Of
course, McGrath might have proposed only that epistemic conservatism could solve
the doxastic problem. But if it cannot also solve a closely related instance of the more
general problem, internalism remains badly off.
This may tempt us to understand epistemic conservatism as stating EC3 after all.
According to EC3, at any time, S’s believing that p prima facie justifies S in
Footnote 11 continued
the justification of stored beliefs at the latter time than at the former. Frise (manuscript b) presents a case
like VIC as a problem for preservationism, the view that memory preserves the justification of the beliefs
it preserves.
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believing that p. S at any time has prima facie justification for anything she believes
then. Because Vic has stored beliefs at noon, he would at noon have justification for
believing the contents of all his stored beliefs. Above I noted that EC3 does not
capture the temporal character of retains and that EC3 seems false, but let’s set
these details aside. EC3 still does not ultimately help with the propositional problem
of stored beliefs presented by VIC. Suppose Ric at noon fails to believe some
proposition q that he has justification for believing and that is not before his mind.
Since Vic is Ric’s mental twin, internalism entails that he too is justified in believing
that q at noon. EC3 (and EC1, for that matter) fails to account for either subject’s
justification for believing that q—by stipulation, at noon neither subject has a belief
that q which could provide this justification. Yet accounting for this justification is
part of the propositional problem of stored beliefs. So EC3, even if true, does not
solve the problem.
Here is my final objection to epistemic conservatism as a solution to the problem
of stored beliefs. As we have seen, epistemic conservatism (understood as just EC1
and EC2) does not count Vic as having justification for believing the contents of any
of his stored beliefs at noon. If epistemic conservatism is a complete solution to the
problem of stored beliefs—if it tells the full story of the justification of our stored
beliefs—then Vic is unjustified in believing the contents of all of his stored beliefs
at noon. But according to EC1, a moment after noon, Vic is prima facie justified in
believing the contents of all stored beliefs he had at noon. We can stipulate that
none of Vic’s mental states, conditions, or events change between noon and a
moment after noon. He has no new memories a moment after noon. We can even
stipulate that there is no intra-mental causal connection between Vic’s mental states
at these times; Vic’s mental life a moment after noon is not caused by his mental life
at noon, but rather is caused by whatever brought about his mental life at noon. A
moment after noon, his noon beliefs give him justification he lacked at noon. So,
Vic is mentally identical to himself at these two times, but his justification is not
identical. Thus epistemic conservatism, if we do not supplement it with some
account of Vic’s noon justification, unexpectedly denies internalism.12 Conse-
quently, it would not solve the problem of stored beliefs for internalism! And, of
course, if we do supplement epistemic conservatism with an account, then it is not
by itself a solution to the problem of stored beliefs.
Contra McGrath, even if epistemic conservatism is true, it does not solve the
problem of stored beliefs. The three reasons for believing this may even refute
epistemic conservatism. I will not argue here that they do. But they do undermine
epistemic conservatism considerably, since one of its main alleged assets is that it
accounts for our justification that concerns memory.13
12 At least, epistemic conservatism would deny what some philosophers (e.g., Goldman (2009:
327–328)) understand as ‘‘traditional’’ internalism. On traditional internalism, a subject’s mental life just
at a time, and not also her mental history, determines her justification at that time. Epistemic conservatism
remains compatible with an untraditional internalism, on which a subject’s mental history matters for her
justification. Huemer (1999: 351–352) defends this variety of internalism, and I challenge it in Frise
(manuscript b); cf. Moon (2012b: 352–354).
13 McCain (2008), McGrath (2007), and Poston (2016) claim that epistemic conservatism has this asset.
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3 Dispositionalism
3.1 Dispositionalism Defended
Several internalists have defended some version of a view that I will call
dispositionalism:
If S has disposition X, then S is prima facie justified in believing that p.
Dispositionalism is a schema. Different versions of it assign different interpretations
to X. On all versions, having a disposition of a certain sort justifies believing a
related proposition. Dispositionalists have tried to solve the problem of stored
beliefs.14 A disposition pertaining to memory can justify a stored belief, they claim,
even when the disposition is not manifest.
In this section I state the most recent and promising dispositionalist attempt to
solve to the problem—namely, Conee and Feldman’s (2011: 303–305) attempt. I
also show that Senor’s (2009) and McGrath’s (2007) objections to the disposition-
alist attempt fail. In the next section, I improve Conee and Feldman’s disposition-
alist attempt. Finally, in the section after, I develop two new arguments showing that
even the improved attempt is unsuccessful.
Conee and Feldman fill out dispositionalism as follows:
DR. If S has a disposition to recollect p, then S is prima facie justified in
believing that p.15
A disposition to recollect p is a disposition to recall p as known, not simply as
believed. Having this disposition does not require p to be true, much less known. If
the disposed recollection is strong and clear enough, and undefeated, it justifies
strongly enough for knowledge. Conee and Feldman (2011: 304) say, of a subject
who has learned a proposition and at noon not forgotten it, that ‘‘one aspect of his
noontime mental condition makes it true that he is able to recall the proposition.’’ A
subject has a recollective disposition toward p when she has learned and has not
forgotten that p, where ‘learned’ is non-factive. That is:
LNF. If S has learned and not forgotten p, then S has a disposition to recollect p.
Conee and Feldman do not say exactly how they mean forgotten, so it is not fully
clear what learning and not forgetting amounts to. But they (2011: 305) note that in
normal cases, a subject’s recollective disposition ‘‘exists by its having been formed
in the past when a proposition was learned, or at least when the proposition seemed
to have been learned, and then retained by a process of long-term memory
consolidation.’’ And learned is best understood broadly here, since Conee and
14 See Audi (1995: 37), Conee and Feldman (2011: 303–305), Ginet (1975: 154–157), and Piazza (2009).
Cf. Conee and Feldman (2004: 236–237). For variations on this attempt, see Conee and Feldman (2004:
67–69), Madison (2014: 49–50), and McCain (2014: 148–149).
15 Conee and Feldman describe recollective dispositions as defeasible, justifying evidence. For simplicity
I omit talk of evidence, and I mostly talk about prima facie justification rather than defeasible justifiers.
Nothing hangs on this. In correspondence, they have confirmed that LNF (below) is part of their view.
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Feldman allow that recollective dispositions can come about via ‘‘brain malfunction
or tampering,’’ and that the disposition still defeasibly justifies, ‘‘whatever its
historical origins.’’
I will call the conjunction of DR, LNF, and Conee and Feldman’s account of a
recollective disposition Conee and Feldman’s dispositionalism. How might their
dispositionalism solve the problem of stored beliefs? They (2011: 304) suggest that
ordinarily a subject with a justified stored belief that q ‘‘has the potential to bring
q to mind with the phenomenology of activating a memory, specifically, the
memory that q.’’ The subject has a disposition to recollect q. Conee and Feldman’s
dispositionalism seems able to account for the propositional and doxastic
justification relevant to the problem of stored beliefs.
Senor (2009) and McGrath (2007) apparently object to any form of disposition-
alism as a solution to the problem of stored beliefs.16 But Conee and Feldman’s
dispositionalism, I argue, is safe from their objections. Senor (2009) says, regarding
the problem of stored beliefs:
This problem might be thought resolved by appealing to counterfactuals or
dispositions. That is, a stored belief might be thought to be prima facie
justified iff were this belief to become occurrent, it would be accompanied by
the appropriate memory image or seeming. Yet this condition is pretty clearly
false. The phenomenology of recollection depends crucially on the context in
which the belief is recalled. Typically, the experience one has when one
recalls a belief depends at least on how the recollection was cued, how much
attention one is currently paying to the recalled belief, and what other beliefs
are then occurrent.
The objection to the dispositionalist solution seems to be that DR is false: a
recollective disposition does not justify. Senor assumes that a disposition is
analyzable in terms of a counterfactual conditional that involves a particular
stimulus condition. The relevant stimulus condition is the justified stored belief’s
becoming occurrent. Senor supports his objection by denying that, in this condition,
the subject would have a justifying memory experience. This is because the
phenomenology of actual recollection is importantly sensitive to contextual factors.
In some contexts, the subject would have justifying phenomenology, but not in
others. Since mere recollection does not justify, a mere recollective disposition does
not either. If Senor’s objection is correct, Conee and Feldman’s dispositionalism
does not solve the problem of stored beliefs.
It is worth noting that the defender of Conee and Feldman’s dispositionalism
need not grant Senor’s conditional analysis of dispositions. It is difficult to state well
what a disposition is, and the conditional analysis is at best highly controversial. We
are free to pick an alternative analysis or to suppose that there simply is no analysis.
We can understand a disposition as we do pre-analytically, and think of a
disposition to recollect p as similar to one’s values, or moods, or character traits,
16 Goldman (1999) does as well, but his objections only threaten a form of dispositionalism that Conee
and Feldman (2011) do not endorse. Since Senor and McGrath identify no particular form of
dispositionalism as their target, their objections seem intended for all forms.
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like shyness or irritability or generosity. It is much easier to recognize that someone
values honesty than it is to find a true counterfactual that corresponds to her valuing
honesty. And, even if we accept a conditional analysis, we are free to identify a
much broader stimulus condition than Senor does.
Still, even if we grant Senor’s assumptions, the support for his objection is
inadequate. His support is that a subject’s circumstances crucially determine the
phenomenology of her recollective experience. The ‘what it’s like’ aspect of
memory experience is importantly context-sensitive. But phenomenology that is
importantly context-sensitive need not relevantly vary. And it is not clear that
recollective phenomenology relevantly varies. True, it varies in strength and in
degree of familiarity. In some contexts the memorial phenomenology a subject has
while recollecting p is more vivid, and in other contexts less. But in all these
contexts the same content is presented to the subject with some memorial
phenomenology—the proposition is brought to mind with, as Conee and Feldman
put it, ‘‘the phenomenology of activating a memory’’. Even though the phe-
nomenology of actual recollection is context-sensitive, it appears sufficiently
invariant to justify invariantly. So this is not a good reason to deny that the
recollective disposition justifies. Senor’s objection may be correct, but it lacks
support.
McGrath (2007: 11) resists dispositionalist solutions for a different reason. He
claims that ‘‘One might have the disposition [to enjoy memorial phenomenology]
without having any [justifying] evidence at all.’’ He tries to illustrate this with an
example like the following:
FARGO
Fargo has forgotten his childhood home phone number. But he is disposed,
when asked precisely about it, to undergo memorial phenomenology regarding
it. If asked ‘‘Is it true that your childhood home phone number was xxx?’’,
Fargo would recall that it was xxx.17
McGrath concludes that ‘‘In such a situation, before being asked, one is not rational
to believe that p. And so one’s being disposed…must not be a way of having the
[justifying] evidence.’’ His point seems to be that dispositionalism would yield too
much justification. One could in very particular circumstances be disposed to
recollect that p, and therefore, unintuitively, count in all circumstances as justified in
believing that p. A dispositionalism like Conee and Feldman’s attributes justifica-
tion where there is none.
However, FARGO reveals no flaw in a dispositionalist solution. FARGO
stipulates that Fargo has forgotten that his childhood home phone number (hereafter
his number) was xxx. On Conee and Feldman’s dispositionalism, the sufficient
condition for having a recollective disposition is: learning and not forgetting. Their
dispositionalism does not imply that Fargo has a disposition to recollect that his
17 The details of FARGO are from McGrath (2007: 11). I’ve named the case and its subject. McGrath
uses FARGO to present an objection that he says is Goldman’s (1999: 278–279). But FARGO improves
the case Goldman uses. In Goldman’s, the subject’s relevant disposition involves information that the
subject has never possessed, so it is doubtful that the subject has a disposition to recollect that
information. So I discuss only FARGO.
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number was xxx. So, their dispositionalism does not attribute to Fargo justification
for believing that his number was xxx.
Similarly, FARGO stipulates that Fargo is disposed to recollect that his number
was xxx when he is asked about it. It does not follow that he has a disposition to
recollect that his number was xxx. If S is disposed to do A in some circumstances C,
it does not follow that S is disposed to do A simpliciter. There is no reason to
suppose that Fargo, prior to being asked about his number, has a disposition to
recollect it. So there is no reason to suppose that on dispositionalism he, prior to
being asked about his number, is justified in believing it was xxx. Further, once
Fargo is asked, it is not implausible that he is justified in believing it was xxx.
I have claimed that FARGO fails to challenge Conee and Feldman’s disposi-
tionalism because Fargo does not satisfy LNF. FARGO stipulates that Fargo has
forgotten his number. There are of course stronger and weaker senses of forgotten
(and its cognates). If my claim is correct, McGrath must mean forgotten in a sense
strong enough that prevents Fargo from having a recollective disposition. McGrath
does not say what he means by the term, but his use is consistently strong. As he
uses the term, it seems one typically does not have a recollective disposition toward
what one forgets. McGrath uses forgotten to describe evidence that ‘‘plays no
current role in the sustaining’’ of belief (6), evidence that contrasts the evidence we
‘‘have’’ (9), and evidence that one can no longer ‘‘provide’’ (9). He also uses it to
describe a whole episode of events that one, by taking a pill, has totally erased from
one’s memory (22). In McGrath’s use of the term, it seems, one is unable to recall
what one forgets, and normally what one forgets is not retained by a process of long-
term memory consolidation. As McGrath talks of forgetting, Fargo’s forgetting
prevents him from having the relevant recollective disposition. As a result, FARGO
provides no reason to think that Conee and Feldman’s dispositionalism attributes
justification where there is none. McGrath’s objection is unsuccessful.
3.2 Dispositionalism Developed
I now offer two improvements for Conee and Feldman’s dispositionalism that
position it better to solve the problem of stored beliefs. Each improvement calls for
a broader understanding of recollective disposition.
First, Conee and Feldman identify a recollective disposition that p as a
disposition to recall p as known. To recall p as known is to have an experience with
the phenomenology of, among other things, consciously knowing that p.18 But given
this view of a recollective disposition, LNF looks false. LNF says that a subject who
has learned and not forgotten p has a disposition to recollect p. But it’s not true that
we are disposed to have an experience with the phenomenology of consciously
knowing just anything that we have learned and not forgotten. We learn certain
things simply by coming to have just some justification for believing them. When
we do not forget these things, we are not thereby disposed to have experiences with
the phenomenology of consciously knowing them. Instead, we are disposed to have
experiences with a weaker sort of phenomenology.
18 Conee and Feldman endorsed this reading of ‘as known’ in correspondence.
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Further, suppose it’s true that by learning and not forgetting a proposition, one is
disposed to recall it as known. It seems that this disposition would provide one with
more than just some justification for believing the proposition—after all, one is
disposed to have an experience with the phenomenology of knowing it. So, if S
learns that p by acquiring just some justification for believing that p, it seems that
S’s justification would increase if S simply does not forget p. Perhaps memory
sometimes boosts justification, but it does not boost it in this way. Fortunately, there
is a broader understanding of recollective dispositions that will avoid all these
troubles and introduce no others. Although we do not seem disposed to recall as
known just anything that we have learned and not forgotten, we do seem disposed to
recall each of these things as true. And being disposed to recall p as true seems to
justify believing that p. Conee and Feldman’s dispositionalism seems more
promising if a recollective disposition is a disposition to recall as true or as known.
Second, in some cases where p is not before the subject’s mind, it seems the
subject has justification for believing that p yet lacks a disposition to recall p as true
or as known. Philosophers and psychologists of memory standardly endorse a
tripartite distinction regarding types of memory systems: semantic (memory for a
proposition), episodic (memory for an experienced event), and procedural (memory
for skill or of how to perform an action).19 Conee and Feldman’s dispositionalism
counts certain dispositions that are a part of semantic memory as justifying. They
think the justifying dispositions dispose subjects to have certain experiences with
propositional content. But semantic memory alone will not solve the problem of
stored beliefs. I will argue that certain justifying dispositions are a part of episodic
memory. Episodic memory enables a re-experiencing of events as experienced
before. Being disposed to recall a set of experienced events that are suitably related
to p justifies believing that p, even in the absence of a disposition to recall p itself.
Consider:
BUSTER
Buster is justified in believing that he took the bus today. But he isn’t disposed
to recall that as true. Rather, his episodic memory disposes him to have
experiences that justify his believing it. Buster is inclined to activate with
memorial phenomenology first-person experiences of his bus ride—memorial
imagery of passengers seated nearby, of trees whizzing in the windows; a
memorial olfactory experience of the smoker beside him; a memorial auditory
experience of the bus droning beneath him. He is inclined to feel these
experiences as connected in a certain temporal order with other experiences.20
Buster is not disposed to recall that he took the bus today. He is instead disposed to
recall many experiences that support believing that proposition. Now, one might
think that, unless Buster consciously associates those experiences with the
proposition, the (disposition to have the) experiences cannot justify him in
19 Philosophers and psychologists use various terms to make more or less the same distinction. In
psychology, Tulving (1982) popularized the semantic/episodic memory distinction. In contemporary
philosophy, Russell (1921/1995) and Martin and Deutscher (1966) influentially discuss episodic memory,
and John Locke talks about it even earlier.
20 For discussion of a similar case see Madison (2014: 39–40).
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believing the proposition. But this seems to over-intellectualize things. When a
subject does not consciously associate her recalling p with p, her recalling still
justifies believing that p. It is hard to see why it would be different when the subject
recalls experiences that support p. Conee and Feldman’s dispositionalism is more
promising if, on it, dispositions to recall events as experienced by the subject count
as recollective, and therefore as justifying. Cases like BUSTER seem common, and
a solution to the propositional problem of stored beliefs must account for them.
Similarly, semantic memory seems to justify some stored beliefs, but not always
by disposing us to recall the content of these beliefs as true or known. Consider:
GIL
Gil has a stored belief that (i) he swam in the Gulf of Mexico. He is disposed
to recall as true that (ii) he swam at a beach in Pensacola, Florida, and that (iii)
Pensacola beaches are on the Gulf of Mexico. But he is not disposed to recall
as true that he swam in the Gulf of Mexico. Rather, he is disposed to infer it
automatically upon recalling (ii) and (iii).
It seems Gil’s stored belief is ultimately justified by some of his dispositions. By
recalling (ii) and (iii), it will become clear to Gil in a memorial way that he swam in
the Gulf of Mexico. A disposition to recall a set of propositions other than p seems
able to justify believing that p. One might object that Gil must think about (ii) and
(iii), or consciously associate them with (i), in order for his inference to justify
believing (i). But, again, this seems to over-intellectualize matters.
In sum, Conee and Feldman’s dispositionalism is more promising if we
understand recollective disposition more broadly. Each of the following should
count as a recollective disposition toward p: (a) a disposition to recall p as known,
(b) a disposition to recall p as true, (c) a disposition to recall experienced events that
jointly and clearly indicate that p, and (d) a disposition to recall a set of propositions
that jointly and clearly indicate that p.
3.3 Dispositionalism Indisposed
I will now offer two arguments that show that Conee and Feldman’s disposition-
alism still does not solve the problem of stored beliefs. Given the support for my
arguments, it is unclear whether their dispositionalism can be improved further.
First, Conee and Feldman’s dispositionalism attributes too much justification.
Recall that LNF states a sufficient condition for S’s having a recollective disposition
toward p: S’s having learned and not forgotten p. However, there is considerable
psychological research suggesting that we forget far less than we are inclined to
think we do. In fact, very little that we learn and store in long-term memory is ever
forgotten.21 Rather, it is just not always directly accessible, and this can mislead us
into thinking it is totally inaccessible. We retain the information and can retrieve it
21 Koutstaal and Schacter (1997) review the psychological research on this. Cf. Wagenaar (1986). Bjork
and Vanhuele (1992: 156) go so far as to claim that any information that makes it into long-term memory
remains there ‘‘essentially forever’’. For philosophical discussion, see Michaelian (2011a: 402–404).
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if cued properly. If this psychological data is roughly accurate, then Conee and
Feldman’s dispositionalism attributes too much justification. A case illustrates this:
MARGO
Margo learned and has not forgotten her childhood home phone number. If
asked ‘‘Is it true that your childhood home phone number was xxx?’’, Margo
would recall that it was xxx. But if merely asked ‘‘What was your childhood
home phone number?’’, Margo would not recall it. And if merely asked ‘‘Can
you recall your childhood home phone number?’’, Margo would not recall it.
In fact, she is disposed to seem to herself unable to recall the number.
Since Margo learned and has not forgotten her childhood home phone number
(hereafter, her number), Conee and Feldman’s dispositionalism implies that she is
disposed to recollect it, and that she is therefore prima facie justified in believing
that it was xxx. Unlike Fargo and his number, Margo has not forgotten her number,
in McGrath’s strong sense of forgotten. She retains her number in her long-term
memory, a (relation to a) representation of her number sustains some memory or
belief for her, Margo still ‘‘has’’ her number, and her number has not been erased
from her memory. She can count as having a recollective disposition.
However, it is plausible that until Margo recalls that her number was xxx, Margo
is overall justified in suspending judgment on whether it was xxx. Although
Margo’s number is available to her via her memory, to her it would seem otherwise.
She is disposed to seem unable to access the number. Ordinarily, if a subject seems
to herself unable to access anything as the correct view on a matter, then she is not
justified in believing any particular view on the matter. Instead, she is justified in
suspending judgment about (or sometimes disbelieving—I’ll omit this option for
simplicity) any particular view. Now, Margo is disposed to seem unable to access
her number. This obstructive disposition should count in favor of suspending
judgment, if a recollective disposition counts in favor of believing. It would be odd
if dispositions to recollect were the only dispositions that affected justification; and
the attitude that a manifest disposition supports reveals the attitude the disposition
supports. So, it is plausible that if Margo is disposed to seem unable to access her
number, she is justified in suspending judgment on each particular view about it,
including that it was xxx. Learning and not forgetting seems to matter little if, from
one’s perspective, it’s as if one never did learn or as if one did forget. If Margo has
no defeater for the prima facie justification that Conee and Feldman’s disposition-
alism attributes to her, their dispositionalism incorrectly implies that she is overall
justified in believing her number was xxx.
One might think Margo does have a defeater. Her disposition to seem unable to
recall her number supplies it. To her, it would seem that there is no number that she
can recall as hers. This gives her reason to doubt that she is disposed to recollect her
number. Perhaps this somehow defeats any justification her recollective disposition
provides. She is not overall justified in believing her number was xxx, so Conee and
Feldman’s dispositionalism has no incorrect implication here.
But, assuming Margo has a defeater, suppose it is blocked. A clearly trustworthy
expert on the matter (say, Margo’s childhood friend, a cognitive psychologist)
testifies to Margo that there is a number that she can recall as her number. This
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testimony could rationally persuade Margo that her apparent inability to recall her
number is misleading (even though, try as she might, Margo still does not recall her
number). In that case, Margo’s alleged justification from her recollective disposition
would be undefeated. But it doesn’t appear that Margo, after hearing the testimony,
should then believe her number was xxx. She still seems to herself unable to recall
her number, and the testimony gives her no hint as to what it was. Until she recalls
some particular number, believing any would to her be arbitrary. Conee and
Feldman’s dispositionalism incorrectly implies that Margo is overall justified in
believing it was xxx.
It might seem that we could satisfactorily revise Conee and Feldman’s
dispositionalism and avoid this objection. The most promising revision limits the
kinds of recollective dispositions that justify. Perhaps dispositions vary in strength.
It could be that all justifying recollective dispositions are stronger than Margo’s
disposition to recollect her number. If that is correct, a revised dispositionalism does
not imply that Margo is prima facie justified in believing that her number was xxx.
This revised dispositionalism revises DR and LNF. A recollective disposition
justifies only if it is strong enough. But how strong is strong enough? And how do
we suitably modify the antecedent of LNF? I see no good answers. We could try
something like:
LNF*. If S has learned and has not forgotten p, and p is easily mentally
accessible to S, then S has a strong disposition to recollect p.22
But ‘is easily mentally accessible to’ is a dispositional relation. Exactly when does
and doesn’t it obtain? The answer is insufficiently clear; we cannot tell whether the
revised dispositionalism solves the problem of stored beliefs without attributing too
much justification. Consider Margo and her number. Isn’t it as mentally accessible
to her as some contents of our justified stored beliefs are to us? It is hard to defend a
‘‘No’’ answer. One defense notes that our access would be quicker than hers. But
Margo’s number is quickly accessible to her, when she is suitably prompted.
Another defense notes that for us there are more diverse suitable prompts than there
are for her—a broader range of circumstances in which there is mental access. But
supposing that is true, why would it matter? The strength of a disposition is not a
mere function of the breadth of circumstances in which the disposition is manifest.
A disposition is not weakened by being masked. (A bubble-wrapped vase is no less
fragile).
Conee and Feldman’s dispositionalism attributes justification where there is
none, and there is no clear, appropriate revision to LNF that avoids this result. And
LNF, even if appropriately revised, faces another problem: it seems false in light of
research from cognitive psychology. This is the second problem for Conee and
Feldman’s dispositionalist solution. That S has learned and not forgotten p is
indeterminate with respect to whether S has a disposition to recollect p. My
objection and support differ importantly from Senor’s. Senor in effect denies DR
(i.e., that recollective dispositions justify) because the phenomenology of recollec-
tion is importantly context-dependent. He thinks that a recollective disposition
22 Cf. Conee and Feldman (2004: 231–232) and McCain (2014: 49–52).
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toward p underdetermines whether the recollective phenomenology will justify
believing p. I do not deny DR. Because recollective phenomenology seems
relevantly invariant, recollection and recollective dispositions might justify. I claim
however that the content we are disposed to recollect is in a relevant way
independent of or underdetermined by what we have learned and not forgotten. So it
is not clear that we have the all of the right recollective dispositions, the ones
required for Conee and Feldman’s dispositionalism to solve the problem of stored
beliefs.
Research in cognitive psychology strongly supports my objection. The prevailing
view among psychologists is that the content of recollection is not a function solely
of what is stored in memory. The context in which the subject retrieves what is
stored matters considerably; several kinds of features of the retrieval context
contribute to what the subject recalls, in some surprising ways. These features not
only partially determine what is retrieved, but also add to it. Let content alteration
at retrieval pick out this phenomenon. I claim that the content alteration that occurs
at retrieval is such that LNF is false. S’s learning and not forgetting p underdeter-
mines whether S is disposed to recollect p. What’s more, S’s learning and not
forgetting any set of propositions underdetermines whether S is disposed to recollect
p—a subject’s network of stored information does not fix her recollective
dispositions.
Of the many features of the retrieval context that result in content alteration, I
will mention just three: the cue that prompts recollection, the related information
the subject has recently retrieved or learned, and the retrieved content itself. Cues
can add substantive details to what the subject retrieves (if, e.g., the cue ‘‘leads the
witness’’), and can determine whether seemingly lost details are retrieved (if, e.g.,
the cue involves visualizing an experienced event, or visualizing a series of events
in various orders).23 Often, recollecting p suppresses recollections related to p,
learning p leads to mistaken recollections about what else one has recently learned,
and thinking about something causes us to incorporate it into a recollection.24 And
the amount of detail in what we retrieve affects what we represent as its source
during recollection.25 In light of phenomena like these, psychologists generally hold
that memory is generative as a rule, not as an exception.26 That is, normal
recollection is a content-creating rather than content-preserving process.
The above suggests that LNF is false. The content of what we recollect
thoroughly depends on our particular retrieval circumstances, not just on what is
stored and retrieved. We are, of course, disposed to employ during memory
experiences information related to what we have learned and not forgotten. But we
23 Michaelian (2011b) and Schacter (2002: Ch.5) discuss the first phenomenon, and Fisher and Edward
(1992) and Schacter (2002: 119–120) discuss the second. Notably, police questioning methods have
changed in light of what psychologists have discovered here.
24 Respectively, see Bjork and Vanhuele (1992: 156); Roediger and McDermott (1995) and Schacter
(2002: 98); and Kelley and Lindsay (1993).
25 See Mitchell and Johnson (2000).
26 For arguments that memory is generative yet reliable, see Michaelian (2011b). For arguments that it is
evolutionarily adaptive that memory is generative, see Bjork and Vanhuele (1992), Michaelian (2011c),
and Schacter (2002).
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are not in general disposed to represent, during these experiences, precisely what we
learned and have not forgotten. Rather, what is stored interacts with features of the
retrieval context, resulting in an output representation. Whether the output matches
what was learned is determined in part by these features. These features are not
interfering with the normal functioning of recollection, as if recollection would
otherwise yield an output that matches what was learned. The features are normal
inputs to recollection. Eliminate these features, and it becomes unclear what, if
anything, we would recollect. But if that is so, then the fact that S has learned and
not forgotten p underdetermines whether S is disposed to recollect p. We should
reject LNF.
Memory processing is complicated, and the rich psychological research on it
leaves much unexplored. We do not yet have a sense of exactly what disposes us to
recollect precisely what we’re disposed to recollect. So there is no clear, good
substitute for LNF. In the absence of a good substitute, we cannot test the
implications of Conee and Feldman’s dispositionalism against our intuitive
judgments about justification. So it does not solve the problem of stored beliefs.
It might seem that LNF is a dispensable feature of Conee and Feldman’s
dispositionalism. We can simply let our guide be our ordinary judgments about who
is disposed to recollect what. By combining these judgments with DR, Conee and
Feldman’s dispositionalism has the desired implications. However, ordinarily, it is
far from clear just which recollective dispositions a subject has. In any event, it is
typically clearer that a subject has (or lacks) a justified stored belief than it is that a
subject is disposed to recollect its content. Our intuitions about recollective
dispositions inadequately play LNF’s role. Of course, for hypothetical cases we can
stipulate which dispositions a subject has. But we cannot do so for actual cases, yet
we need to test Conee and Feldman’s dispositionalism against actual cases.
4 Conclusion
The internalist attempts to solve the problem of stored beliefs are unsuccessful.
Epistemic conservatism attributes both too much and too little justification. And the
most promising form of dispositionalism attributes too much justification yet also
has too few testable implications. This appears to leave internalism in an
uncomfortable position; it may face a crucial problem it cannot solve, and a key
argument for internalism (namely, that it gets the cases right) may fail. I do not think
internalists should despair, however. As I argue in Frise (manuscript a), there is a
plausible solution to the problem available both to internalists and to externalists.
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